

DEUEL, W.R.

DEUEL, W.R.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

23 MAY 1945

FROM

USTRAVIC, LONDON

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

SECRETARIAT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57862-3

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#29584. TO DUXTON AND CHESTON FROM 109.

WALLIS DEVEL WISHES US TO REQUEST STATE DEPARTMENT TO RELEASE HIM TO US AND THEN WE WOULD REASSIGN HIM TO HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON. THIS I AGREED TO DO AT THE TIME HE WAS ASSIGNED TO MURPHY. WILL YOU ARRANGE ACCORDINGLY.

Am

TOR: 1211 23 MAY 1945

SECRET

TILL GUT 1

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Form 89 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 12 MAY 45
FROM

TO PARIS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

SUPERVISOR

IN: 12372

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, FIELD SECTION *Soutgate*

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57742-6

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15971.

109 FROM FORGAN.

To Duell Soutgate

1. WALLACE DUELL DESIROUS BEING REASSIGNED OSS. MURPHY, ALTHOUGH WANTING KEEP HIM, HAS AGREED TO ABIDE BY HIS WISHES. TO GET HIM BACK IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR YOU REQUEST STATE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, RETURN HIM OSS. THIS AGREEABLE TO MURPHY.

2. DUELL VERY ANXIOUS GET HOME SOONEST. WE ARE PREPARED ISSUE ORDERS AND FACILITATE PASSAGE HERE AS SOON AS REASSIGNED TO US.

3. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN ACTION TAKEN.

*See S. checked
they you arrange with for
the D. on this
1945*

TOR: 1429 12

MAY 45

FILE COPY

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CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 24 February, 1945

TO : General William J. Donovan
 FROM : Richard Southgate R.S.
 SUBJECT: Mrs. Wallace Deuel

I have talked with General Holmes about the case of Mrs. Deuel going to Paris, the matter has been thoroughly investigated and the situation is as follows:

The State Department has a strict regulation against the wives of any other than regular career State Department officials proceeding at this time to either London or Paris. Even auxiliary Foreign Service officers may not have their wives proceed to those posts. To send Mrs. Deuel to Paris would constitute a violation of this rule and would make it very embarrassing for the Department vis-a-vis its own auxiliary officers and representatives of other agencies. They asked that we do not press the matter and I can sympathize with their position.

Mrs. Shipley states, however, that in a month or six weeks the situation is expected to alter and at that time Mrs. Deuel would presumably be allowed to go. I have so advised her.

I have not discussed with the State Department the question of paying the expenses of her journey, as I do not know your views on this point. Mrs. Deuel, however, says that she is not in a position to pay the expenses herself.

SECRET

089
Form 59 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE
FROM

NOVEMBER 8, 1944

TO

OSTRAVICO, LONDON

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

FOR INFORMATION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

NO

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE (16-37042-1)

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, ETC, X-2,
MACRUEN, BUCKINGHAM

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#37324. To 109 and Mann from Armour.
Your #79724.

We will attempt contact Duell here. What we must have is individual as completely conversant with German language, people, customs, as Tom Delmer, and he must also be able to accept editorial responsibility. Unless Gallies honestly fits everyone of these specifications he not needed here.

SECRET

TOR: 11/8/44 10:16 p.m.

FILE COPY

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Form 68 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 11/11/44

REC'D

11/11/44 7:47 PM

TO : WARC, LONDON

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT 22735

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

NO

FOR INFORMATION

OF COM, SEC TARIAT, CAMBER,
1 BY, STO, 4-8

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57843-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER**SECRET**

✓ 11/10/44. Baldwin from Mann. Referring to our 1799215, 11/10/44

Murphy reports unable spare Deuel.

Deuel, Wallace 157321

FILE COPY

SECRET

TOD: 11/11/44 9:23 PM

D. EDM. ELS, JEW

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE **NOVEMBER 16, 1964**

TIME **11/16/64 - 11:15PM**

TO **UNITED STATES, LONDON**

PRECEDENCE

FROM **OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CONFIRMATION
INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, DISTRICT, CTS, S-4,

TRANSMITTED IN CODE ON CIPHER

SECRET

FROM: AMEMB AND WASHINGTON FROM WASH.

**REUR 070224 WASHINGTON BEING CALLED DIRECT BY 101, SIGNAL
SIGNAL. MAY BE ON CONTINUITY WITH GIBBY. WILL ATTEMPT REPLY
BE CALLED BY GIBBY.**

SECRET

**TIME 11/16/64 - 11:15PM
UNCLASSIFIED AND OLD COPY**

FILE

**IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT**

ADDRESS REPTAL, PRODUCE AND COMMISSION TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
FO 103.91802/11-944

November 11, 1944

SECRET

The Department of State transmits to the Office of Strategic Services the attached information in the hope that it will be of value.

Attachment:

Copy of paraphrase of telegram no. 9733 from London,
dated November 9, 1944.



PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

No. 9753
From: London
To: Secretary of State
Date: November 9, 1944

S E C R E T

Impossible to release Duell to OSS at this time
since I have only three persons on my staff, although I
would like to accommodate Donovan. Please explain this
to him.

Gallman

Form 88 (Rev. 11-15-43)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE NOVEMBER 4, 1944

REC'D 11/5/44 1:01 PM

TO USTRAVIC, LONDON

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

FOR TARIAT, WASHBURN, BIGELOW, BLO,
MO, X-8

OUT 21210

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-61850-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#79724. To Armour and Baldwin from 109. Re your #96764.

Congratulations success in securing radio time.
Wallace Duell in in London as special assistant to Robert
Murphy of State Department. Suggest you contact him personally.
Meanwhile am urging MO to ship Gallico if he will go.

Germany X

SECRET

TOD: 11/5/44 1:56 PM

WJD

THE COPY

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OSU FORM 400A

SECRET

Date: 6 Nov. 1944

General Donovan

Subject: Reply to Armour
and Baldwin re Wallace-Demol.

The attached is for your
signature.

W.A. Miller
W. A. Miller
1st Lt. GAO

per

SECRET

86764 for [unclear]

Office of the Secretariat

(01/9)

Form 62 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

NOVEMBER 5, 1944

FROM

USTRAVIC, LONDON

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON, DC
X-3. STS

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#00764. To 100 and Mann from Arnold and Baldwin.

Arrangements have been made whereby we have correct radio facilities from here both as to time and technical facilities for Black radio program. Have access to all necessary intelligence for such program. However, it essential we have individual in charge this project who is as familiar with Germany and fluent in German language as Delmer. Is it possible send Wallace Deuel immediately for period of 60 days? If he cannot arrive here within next week or 10 days we will have to make other arrangements locally. Unless we can take complete advantage of opportunity by producing first class program we don't think we should broadcast something that is obviously amateurish.

Amal by 79.724 to Paris

R.T. Find out where W.D. is
+ wire him.
Notify A & B

TOR: 11/5/44 12:25 p.m.

SECRET

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OSR Form 1001
(Rev. 11-27-60)

OSR SECRETARIAT - HOUSE SLIP

TO	NAME	INITIALS
	C. C. Dossman, Jr.	
	J. J. Morgan	
✓	E. J. Pittrell, Jr.	
	R. Thum	
	D. C. Lee	
	J. W. Auchincloss	
	W. N. Kantack	
	W. H. Niley	
	P. F. Fogleson	
	A. W. Galloway	
	J. H. Donovan	
	A. W. Amutha, Jr.	
	A. L. Part	
	H. H. Hamilton	
	I. B. Houston	
	C. B. McClelland	
	J. L. McDonnell	
	J. R. Schooner, Jr.	
	Secretariat Files	
✓	Director's Files	
	D. G. C. Files	

Frank at state had given
us the title of "Press Officer" for
David but it apparently was
changed by higher-ups.

So long as we know the
proper title, I don't think it
requires us to change what we
did.

PSD

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Ensign James S. Donovan
 FROM : Margaret Feldman
 SUBJECT: Mr. Wallace R. Deuel

DATE: 3 October 1944

PM OCT 3 PM 5 27

OSS

Confirming our telephone conversation yesterday, we have requested the designation of Special Assistant to the U. S. Political Advisor to the Supreme Allied Headquarters, for Mr. Wallace R. Deuel. The Department has been advised that salary and expenses will be paid direct to subject by this agency. In the event, however, that incidental expenses are incurred by the Department in behalf of Mr. Deuel, the Department is instructed to request reimbursement from Mr. R. G. White of Special Funds.

We are advised that Mr. Laurence Frank of the Department is proceeding with the requested designation and transportation for Mr. Deuel.

hit
 M. F.

P. S. Since dictating the above we have been advised by the Department of State that this matter is in the hands of the "issuing office"—which means that the passport will be issued very shortly and that the letter of designation is being prepared. When the letter of designation is received I shall forward it to you immediately.

SECRET

6/12/44
Frank Wallace

1. paid for the
1 plus office
20 September 1944

1 Humphry, D. 65

Hon. C. Newland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Shaw:

Referring to your letter dated 23 September 1944 concerning Mr. Wallace Deuel, I wish to confirm in all respects your understanding of the matter. Mr. Deuel is reporting for duty with the Department of State on 1 October 1944.

Sincerely yours,

William F. Danvers
Director

20 September 1944

Hon. G. Howland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Shaw:

Referring to your letter dated 20 September 1944 concerning Mr. Wallace Boudel, I wish to confirm in all respects your understanding of the matter. Mr. Boudel is reporting for duty with the Department of State on 1 October 1944.

Sincerely yours,

William F. Browder
Director

Form 100
(Rev. 11/1/44)

099 SECRETARIAT ROUTE SLIP

1070 6 Oct

TO	NAME	INITIALS
	D. C. Donohue, Jr.	
	J. L. Monahan	
✓	R. J. Pateall, Jr.	
	R. Thrum	
	D. C. Lee	
	J. R. Auchincloss	
	W. H. Kautsch	
	W. H. Miloy	
	P. F. Pugliese	
	A. W. Sullivan	
	J. H. Donovan	
	A. W. Agnew, Jr.	
	A. L. Dart	
	H. H. Hamilton	
	L. R. Houston	
	C. S. McCallister	
	J. L. McDonnell	
	J. R. Schoenopf, Jr.	
	Secretariat Files	
	Director's Files	
	O. G. C. Files	

General D. stated when we
arranged matters here with
Davel that we would pay
all expenses.

1/39

To: John

✓ Please note
Jim Brown is
coming to see
the

Director's Office

(3908)

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1944

My dear General Donovan:

You will recall the recent discussions between officers of the State Department and of the Office of Strategic Services as a result of which a preliminary arrangement was agreed upon whereby your office would make available to the Department the services of Mr. Wallace Deuel. In conformity with this agreement, Mr. Deuel will be assigned to handle Public Relations functions on the staff of The Honorable Robert Murphy, U. S. Political Adviser on German Affairs, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Your cooperation in detaching Mr. Deuel to the Department for this purpose is very greatly appreciated.

The Department is willing to place Mr. Deuel on its pay roll but it is my understanding that you prefer that his salary and allowances, including representation, rent and cost of living, be paid from funds available to the Office of Strategic Services. If my understanding is correct, the Department of State will pay the expenses for transportation and the per diem that will accrue when traveling.

In confirming this understanding may I also ask you to indicate when Mr. Deuel may report to this Department?

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

G. Howland Shaw

G. Howland Shaw
Assistant Secretary

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.



Handwritten: Special, Sample
SECRET

26 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR WALLACE R. BROWN

1. You are hereby directed as of 1 October 1944 to accept the assignment, proposed by the Department of State, to serve for the Department as Press Officer to Ambassador Robert D. Murphy in his capacity as political adviser on German matters to General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
2. For the duration of this assignment, you will be considered as being on loan to the Department of State and as being on temporary leave of absence from your post of Special Assistant to the Director of OSS.
3. Your salary and expenses while on your assignment for the Department of State will be handled in accordance with my memorandum to Special Funds Branch dated 26 September 1944, of which you have a copy.
4. My instructions to you of 1 August 1944 to transfer your headquarters--and, in consequence, your family and household goods--to Washington as soon as convenient, remain effective. You are, accordingly, to complete this transfer, which it is understood you have already begun, at your and your family's convenience, even if you should have to leave on your assignment for the State Department before the transfer can be completed. All reasonable expenses in connection with this move are to be borne out of Special Funds.

William J. Donovan
 Director.

SECRET

15, 1944
 Laid, 1/1/44
 SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT made this 15th day of January, 1944, between the United States of America (hereinafter called "the Government"), represented by the Office of Strategic Services, and Wallace R. Smith (hereinafter called "the Employee").

WITNESSETH:

1. The Employee shall faithfully perform, in an employer-employee relationship and under the supervision and control of the Office of Strategic Services, all duties within or without the continental limits of the United States which may be assigned to him by said office.

2. The term of employment shall be from the effective date hereof to the termination of the present hostilities and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated as hereinafter provided.

3. The Government further agrees:

(a) To compensate the Employee at a base salary of \$248.66 per month, less any amounts withheld pursuant to law;

(b) To pay the cost of all travel by the Employee necessary to the performance of his duties hereunder, including the cost of travel from Washington to his overseas headquarters, and upon termination of this agreement to pay the cost of transporting the Employee from his then location to the place at which this agreement shall have been executed;

(c) To pay the Employee an allowance in the amount of \$800 per month, which shall include all normal living and quarters allowance, travel per diem when away from his overseas headquarters, necessary entertainment, etc., (in accordance with State Department regulations) and extraordinary expenses incurred in connection with the performance of his duties hereunder, and an accounting therefor shall be rendered by the Employee to the Director, Office of Strategic Services, upon the Employee's return from overseas;

(d) To reimburse the Employee for the actual cost of any passport photographs, foreign visas, cablegrams or radiograms necessary to the performance of his duties hereunder;

4. The Employee further agrees:

(a) To subscribe freely and without reservation to any oath of Office prescribed by the Office of Strategic Services;

(b) To keep confidential this agreement and all information which he may obtain by reason hereof, and to refrain from disclosing the same to any person other than those authorized to receive such information, and to execute and submit to the Government all reports, questionnaires, and other applications lawfully required of him.

(c) To waive all manner of claims or demands against the Government which may arise out of this employment, other than his claims under the U. S. Employees Compensation Act (5 U.S.C., Ch. 15, as amended) and 50 U.S.C. 1001-1010.

5. This employment may be terminated by either party hereto upon 30 days' written notice to the other party, but such termination shall not release the Employee from the provisions of subparagraphs 4(b) and 4(c) hereof.
6. It is the intention of the parties that the Employee shall receive no compensation or allowances from the State Department during the period of, and in connection with, his employment hereunder, but that all such compensation and allowances from the Government shall be paid by the Office of Strategic Services. In the event the Employee should receive from the State Department any compensation or allowances during the period of, or in connection with, his employment hereunder, he shall pay over any such amounts to the Office of Strategic Services for reimbursement to the State Department.
7. All factual disputes arising hereunder shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, Office of Strategic Services, subject to written appeal within thirty (30) days by the Employee to the Director of OSS or his duly authorized representative; the Employee meantime shall diligently proceed with the performance of his duties and services.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Government and the Employee have caused this agreement to be signed and sealed in _____, intending to be legally bound thereby.

(L.S.)

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By _____

Contracting Officer
Office of Strategic Services

55

On this _____ day of _____, 19____, before me, an officer duly qualified to administer oaths, personally came Wallace R. Bond, known to me and by me known to be the person who executed the foregoing instrument as "Employee", and he duly acknowledged the same to be his act and deed.

SECRET

15 September 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Special Funds Branch
FROM: Director
SUBJECT: Wallace R. Deuel

1. I have directed that commencing 1 October 1944 Mr. Wallace R. Deuel, about to be appointed Press Officer to Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, be compensated by this agency out of Special Funds in the following amounts, which have been determined to be appropriate:

Salary - - - - - \$8,000 per annum base

Allowances - - - \$8,000 per annum

2. Mr. Deuel's above-stated allowance is to include all normal living and quarters allowances, travel per diem when away from his overseas headquarters, necessary entertainment, etc. (in accordance with State Department computations) and the remainder is to compensate him for extraordinary expenses which he will incur in connection with confidential tasks which he will perform for me. Mr. Deuel will account to me for this allowance, upon his return. This agency will defray the cost of this transportation from Washington to his overseas headquarters.

3. The State Department has told us that arrangements as to compensation are to be determined solely by this agency; there therefore need be no discussion of the above with the Department.

William J. Donovan

SECRET

(23084)

SECRET

SECRET**EXPENSE ACCOUNT**

To: Special Funds Research
 FROM:

DATE 15 September 1944

I hereby certify that the expenses itemized below were incurred by me in connection with official business of a confidential nature for the Office of Strategic Services, and that I have not used, nor will I be, reimbursed for such expenses from any other government or private source.

Transportation \$
 From To
 Commencing Ending
 Hotels and Meals
 (Not over \$6.00 p.d. domestic or \$7.00 p.d. abroad)
 Messages
 Taxis
 Obtaining Strategic Information
 Special Activities
 Others (Specify) 1000.00
 Total \$ 1000.00

Remarks: Paid to W. R. D. for confidential purposes, details
 . . . of which will be kept in my office.

Project No. _____

Branch Director's Office

WFO

Signature

Director

Department

SECRET

15116... 12,942
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON D C

October 29, 1943

Memorandum for Colonel Rehn:

Wallace R. Deuel, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of the Director, has been under civil service thus far.

Because of the nature of the work he is now doing for me, and the terms on which I wish him to do this work, it may prove necessary for him to go on unvouchered funds.

If he should request you to put him on unvouchered funds at any time while I am absent from Washington, please take this memorandum as authority and instructions to accede to such request as speedily as may be convenient.

Form 10 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 3 AUGUST 1945

FROM CHAFX, KUNMING

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

10 2025

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER**SECRET**
SECRET

#19437. CHESTON FROM 109. KUNMING-CHUNGKING #0017. REFERENCE YOUR
#21567 (OUT 18994).

YOU ARE RIGHT ABOUT HALLY. PLEASE TELL HIM I AM SORRY
LET HIM GO AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR ALL THE HELP HE HAS BEEN TO US.
I WILL SEE HIM ON RETURN AND THINK HIS NEW POSITION IS OF GREAT
IMPORTANCE AND GOOD INFLUENCE FOR AMERICA.

*Given to Duell by
me case*

SECRET

TOR: 0422 3 AUGUST 1945

FILE COPY

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Form 10-1 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 1 AUGUST 1945

REC'D

1712 1 AUGUST 45

TO SEE BELOW

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

DIRECTOR

Wally Devel

FOR INFORMATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57491-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER**SECRET**

#21567. CHAFX, KUNMING. (OUT 18964)

#17757. MAWOL, CHUNGKING. (OUT 18963)

CHESTON TO 109.

WALLY DEVEL HAS BEEN ASKED BY JOHN KNIGHT TO RETURN TO THE DAILY NEWS SEPTEMBER 1 TO COVER AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM WASHINGTON. HE VERY MUCH WANTS TO ACCEPT. I HAVE AGREED TO THIS AND TOLD HIM I KNEW YOU WOULD BE SORRY TO SEE HIM GO BUT THAT YOU WOULD NOT WANT HIM TO MISS THIS OPPORTUNITY.

TOD: 152 1 AUGUST 1945

FILE COPY

CSC

SECRET

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

*Daniel
Folcher*

Date: June 1, 1943

To: GENERAL LEAHMAN
From: WALLACE R. DEUEL
Subject: WQXR

One of the directors of Station WQXR has just phoned to ask if I would be available as a regular commentator on their programs. I explained that I was working with you and that I had more than enough to do to discharge my duties in the Office, also that it would be incompatible with my Government service to engage in any kind of regular outside employment, although I might be available at infrequent intervals for some special program such as "This is the Enemy."

I report this only so that you will know that if I could ever serve your purposes by broadcasting for WQXR, it could probably be arranged.

D-11807

To: Mr. Shepardon

Could you please read
the attached and return.

WJD

WJD: I have read this:

I think (a) RYA should check
on this

(b) R+ A unit (London)

There was a babying adjustment
these also check
Director's Office

(3308)

(c) I think it should be
sent to Major Jackson (London) & Major

Lund

U.S. Army Anti-Security

Staircase / long
who are working

April 19, 1946

MEMORANDUM

TO: WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
FROM: WALLACE R. DEUEL
SUBJECT: Regensburg

A friend who spent a good many years in southern Germany has written me as follows about the city of Regensburg. I have no way of telling how valid these comments are, but I assume that you have more than adequate means of checking such stuff:

"Regensburg is of much more importance to Hitler's war machine, and especially to his U-boat war, than either Nuremberg or Munich. Yet except for one ineffectual attempt to bomb it early in 1941, I believe, it seems to have been overlooked altogether.

"Regensburg, long before the war, was quite a large boat building centre. All those motor speed boats, and pleasure craft, you used to see racing in and out of the Späse were mostly all built in Regensburg. You can bet your bottom dollar that those speed-boat building yards, and there are several acres of building sheds extending down the river banks, are now building submarine hulks and motor torpedo boats.

"Then Regensburg is a large shipping centre. It is situated on the confluence of the Rhine and Danube, and its locks control most of the Danube traffic. Think what a lovely mess, a nice hit on those locks would make of the Nazi river barge traffic; the barges loaded with ore and other stuff coming up the Danube all used to have to unload at Regensburg in their passage to the Rhineland industries. But in 1934, perhaps you remember, Dr. Test began building that canal between Donaueschingen and Regensburg and beyond—I have forgotten the name of the place, which allows shipping from the Danube to go into the Rhine without unloading at Regensburg. Some of the locks are at Regensburg. I know because I have seen them.

"Then a hit at Regensburg would also be a bit in the Nazi stomach, because under Goering's four year plan, Regensburg became the chief grain and food storage depot for central and southwestern Germany. It was chosen because of its proximity to the Aigo where most of Germany's condensed food industry is located. Incidentally, this condensed food industry originated with the bakers of the Zeppelin works and was, and is still I

bell. No, directed from Linden and Friedrichshafen. But, of course, the food storage silos are mostly underground, and would be hard to locate from the air. But Regensburg itself is quite compact, and except for the Schweinfurt cloackl, and of course, the Dom, I don't believe any of its officials would mind if it received a good pounding especially as it would be in a good cause. Incidentally, the Hermann Goering Kupfererzwerk, the only copper refining plant in Germany, is just twelve kilometers outside of Regensburg on the road down to Munich. It stands on a high eminence all by itself -- the plant occupies several acres, and its distinguishing features are that all the buildings including the refining plant with a huge towering smoke stack, is built of sort of salmon colored brick.

"Ulm, Neu Ulm and the old city, are also doing their bit for Hitler's U-boat industry, and so, no doubt, is Passau. But Passau would be harder to get at than either Regensburg or Ulm. But tell them to be careful of the Minster, the oldest Cathedral in South Germany. After all we don't want to get the Bavarians' back up.

"You might tell somebody that when they go after Stuttgart again, not to miss Goepfingen and Kitzingen, the two southwestern suburbs because that is where the largest of Stuttgart's electrical plants are located. If the planes follow the track or autobahn highway out of Stuttgart they will see it because the huge generators and power transmitters stand squat on the highway."

General Donovan
SECRET

Mr. John G. Hughes
c. c. General Donovan
Wallace R. Dowel

18 August 1944

Post-War Planning.

1. Nigerized Background.

I am now engaged in preparing a first rough draft of the history of SI Washington and SI New York, and I am reminded that in this account I have gone into some considerable detail regarding the disadvantages at which the United States found itself, at the onset of the present war, because of the lack of an SI, and regarding the reasons why it was decided to entrust the setting up and direction of an SI to General Donovan. It occurs to me that you might find this account relevant to the problem under consideration. The story is not yet even typed, but it soon will be. Let me know if you would like to see a copy.

2. Types of Intelligence Required.

I have not been in close enough touch with SI operations to have a right to any very profound convictions on this score. I assume, though, that both military and naval intelligence, strictly construed, will certainly be required; that political intelligence will be at least as important in future as it has been in the past; that data on business and labor will be wanted; and that at least three categories of intelligence should be even more diligently sought after than it has been possible to seek after them now — namely, propaganda intelligence, information on scientific developments and personal data.

I don't know much about our problems in collecting scientific information, but I have had a certain amount of experience, for my sins, in the problems connected with obtaining adequate propaganda information and data on key personalities. If our propaganda is to be effective, it must be based, obviously, on a thorough grasp of the psychological characteristics of target peoples, on a knowledge of target peoples' histories and institutions — including, not particularly, the press and radio — and on other data relevant to the possibilities and effectiveness of propaganda, such as radio-listening habits.

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most effective times of the day for broadcasting attitudes of target peoples toward a wide variety of national and international issues, types of paper, ink and print best employed for various purposes, etc.

Data on key personalities requires a long time to accumulate, as I hardly need to point out. It can be obtained to a considerable extent by diplomatic and consular officers, especially if these men will cooperate effectively with American newspaper correspondents, students, business representatives and others in each country. Some of the most useful personal data, though, would have to be secured by undercover methods.

3. Methods of Collecting Intelligence.

Of these various types of intelligence, the first and last (that is, military and naval intelligence and data on key personalities) would require undercover methods, I should think, even in peacetime. It ought to be possible to collect much, if not most, of the desired information in other categories by more or less open methods in peacetime. Therefore, I should imagine that only the merest skeleton organization or organizations would be required for the collection of political, business, labor, propaganda and scientific intelligence in peacetime. At the same time, a very considerable volume of information of these sorts certainly should be accumulated in peacetime, to serve as a basis and background for further information which would have to be collected for the most part by undercover methods after the outbreak of a war.

In a future war or wars, it might be impossible to secure anything like the degree of cooperation with labor which has been obtained this time. Nevertheless, it seems to me, that labor should be cultivated in future, even if working men and working women might not be on our side in another war, in order to obtain valuable information, not only about labor, but about other subjects as well. Our professional foreign service officers are not particularly well suited, on the whole, for the task of cultivating labor sources abroad, and it occurs to me to wonder if it might not be a good idea to consider the possibility of setting up a system of labor attaches, possibly chosen by the Department of Labor, to accomplish this purpose. They could make and maintain contacts during peacetime, from which undercover AI

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agents could select sources which could be exploited during time of war.

The Treasury and Commercial Attaches, for their part, would serve similar functions in connection with business, banking and industry.

I am too ignorant of the work of our Agricultural Attaches, and of ~~the~~ problems abroad in general, to be able to suggest whether or not these attaches might be able to serve a useful purpose from the viewpoint of an undercover intelligence service.

Still another type of attache might be worth considering, namely, press representatives, to be attached to each American Embassy and Legation. These attaches, if well chosen, could be extremely useful in involving the collaboration of both American and other newspapermen abroad. Obviously, the newspapermen would not know that they were being used, but nevertheless they could doubtless be persuaded to collect a good deal of information which would be of value, both to themselves and to an intelligence service. Their help should be particularly useful in obtaining political data, data on key personalities and propaganda intelligence.

4. Place In The Government.

I should think it would be undesirable to have an undercover intelligence service made directly responsible to the President. I should think that this would give the President a power which Congress would be loath to grant any President -- and which, in fact, I should myself dislike to see any President wield.

I should think it undesirable, by the same token, to turn the undercover intelligence service over to the FBI. Secret intelligence of the sort required is so different from the types of information which the FBI is trained and competent to collect, that I should think an SI agency would require, in effect, a whole new Bureau within the FBI. In other words, there is no functional justification for turning over SI to the FBI. Also, I should be much alarmed to have so much power concentrated in the hands of any one man.

Neither could or should SI be turned over to either G-2 or ONI. In my history of SI, I have discussed at some length the reasons why neither of the services

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was made responsible for setting up the undercover intelligence work, and it seems to me that the reasons which were valid this time apply with equal force to the future.

It seems to me that an undercover service must be responsible, at the top, either to the State Department or to the armed services, or to a combination of the two which might be effected by means of a Cabinet Committee.

I should think that it would be better for SIS to be responsible to the armed services. An undercover intelligence agency serves the needs of the armed forces in considerably greater degree than it serves the needs of the State Department. Such an agency requires a high degree of expert military knowledge on the part of both its field agents and its headquarters. Particularly in time of war, an SIS would have to work even more closely with the services than with the Department.

The manner in which an SIS should be incorporated in the military establishment will depend in the first instance, I should imagine, on the organizational set-up of the services after the war. If there is a single Ministry of Defense, the responsible director of SIS could report directly to the Cabinet Minister or to an Under-Secretary. If the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is maintained, then I should think that the SIS could report directly to the Joint Chiefs, even if there is no single Ministry of Defense.

If there is neither a single Ministry of Defense nor an Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is not easy to see how the SIS could best be made responsible to the armed forces, except through a Joint Cabinet Committee or Committee of Under-Secretaries, in which event, I should think that the Department of State should be represented in the Committee, as well as the War and Navy Departments.

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SECRET

Walter L. Doolittle 3752
Working 11 611
10/1/44
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General William J. Donovan
FROM: Wallace R. Dool *W. R. Dool*
SUBJECT: OSS History/Colonel Eddy

DATE: 19 June 1944

I hear that Colonel Eddy is in Washington.
Could you please ask him to write the fullest possible account
of the North African operation for the History?

Called Dool 6/28 who will request Col Eddy to call Col Eddy on this matter.
Done

General [unclear] 9-25-51
to [unclear]
General

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, D C

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111

April 21, 1944

To: General Donovan
 From: Wallace R. Daniel
 Subject: History

1. Preparation of the history of OSS has reached a stage at which it is both necessary and possible for me to delegate a good deal of work.

2. More specifically:

- (a) The records of OSS operations in all theaters should be examined with a view to ascertaining whether they include all data required for the history.
- (b) In cases in which required data are found to be lacking, those data should be obtained. Thus, a preliminary survey of the records seems to indicate that while administrative, fiscal and similar sorts of data are adequate, it would be desirable to obtain more colorful, first-hand, eye-witness accounts of actual field operations.
- (c) The records, when completed, should be assembled and edited in a series of documentary collections for each theater, so organized as to constitute consecutive accounts of OSS operations by theaters.
- (d) These documentary collections should be kept up to date.

3. Col Richards tells me that his staff could do the work described in Paragraph 2, above, in the course of doing the work in which they are at present engaged.

4. Recommended:

- (a) That Col. Richards and I be authorized, in collaboration with Major Duncan Lee, to plan and execute the program described in Paragraph 2, above.
- (b) That Strategic Service Officers in the field be asked, through the Secretariat, to furnish more colorful, first-hand, eye-witness accounts of field operations.

SECRET

a. o. for General Enoyan
Reference: Letter to Miss Justice Tamm
Bureau of the Budget
October 30, 1943

Enoyan, Miss Justice Tamm
Bureau of the Budget
October 30, 1943
CONFIDENTIAL

January 13, 1944

Mr. John H. Moriarty
The Library of Congress
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Moriarty:

The problem of security is so difficult a one in this Office that I feel able to make only one use of such material as I have prepared -- or may prepare in future -- on the history of the Agency, namely, to place it in the hands of the Director. Explicit instructions from the Director would be necessary before this material could be given any wider circulation than this.

I am, accordingly, sending the Director a copy of your letter to me and of my answer, so that he will be in a position to take whatever action seems appropriate to him.

I may say, that I have been assigned to other duties, and therefore may have nothing further to do with preparing the history of the Office. It is, however, possible that I may be put back on the historical assignment at some time in the future.

I am sorry to be late in replying to your letter. I have been away much of the time the past several weeks.

Very sincerely yours,

Wallace R. Dezel,
Special Assistant to the Director.

JW/yw

December 21, 1943

Mr. Wallace Deuel
Special Assistant to the Director
630 Fifth Avenue
New York City, New York

Dear Mr. Deuel:

The Library of Congress is attempting to secure a complete file of all publications issued by the various agencies of the Federal Government. Undoubtedly, you will prepare publications either printed or processed dealing with the historical activities of the Office of Strategic Services. I, therefore, respectfully request that two copies of any such publication be sent to the Library of Congress.

Should any of the publications which you prepare possess for the present a confidential status, we will, naturally, withhold them absolutely from the public and the general staff of the Library as well until such time as they are released by your office.

With deepest appreciation of any cooperation you can give us in this matter, I am


Very sincerely yours,

John H. Merriarty
Assistant Director for Operations

Date 15 December 45

To: COLONEL DIXON

Attached is a copy of a letter from Mr. Deval to Mr. Walter L. Wright of the War Department, outlining the historical work which Mr. Deval is doing for OSS.



[Handwritten signature]
The Secretary

(133)

David Hoffman 9755
CONFIDENTIAL
Principal

December 15, 1944.

Mr. Walter L. Wright, Jr.
 War Department
 War Department General Staff
 Military Intelligence Division G-2
 Room 5B-753, Pentagon
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Livy:

It was swell to hear from you, and to learn of your new job. I don't know whether to compliment you or to commiserate with you. I think, on the whole, the job calls for both kinds of salute. It must be as difficult and responsible a task as it is an important one. I am delighted that you are the one to undertake it.

I am in Washington from time to time, and I shall certainly give you a ring next time I am there and can call my soul my own. It would be swell to see you.

I must pledge you to secrecy on the status of my historical labors. I found, not so long ago, that the people in the Bureau of the Budget who are encouraging and facilitating such labors were communicating to a fairly large number of persons, both inside the government and outside, reports on the progress of these various projects, based on the reports which the historical officers were making to the Bureau of the Budget. This obviously endangered security -- and you know how passionately we feel about security in this office. The mere fact that anyone individual was writing a history of the OSS manifestly indicated that that person knew -- or would learn -- practically all the secrets of the organization, and this would necessarily make that person an object of the greatest interest to enemy counter-espionage. I don't want to make myself sound like a romantic, and lurid, figure but I do think the principle is sound.

As soon as I found this out, I therefore officially informed the Bureau of the Budget people that I had been assigned to other work. I hope Divine Providence will forgive me of this deception. In any event, I feel I must maintain it. The following account of my progress is, accordingly, for your secure files alone. I should be greatly embarrassed if anyone else found out about it.

Based on the outline which you sent me, here is an account of my work:

- 2 -

1. Name of Agency. Office of Strategic Services.
2. Designation of the historical unit. There is no formal designation. General Donovan asked me approximately one year ago to write the official history of the OSS, but he never designated me by any other title than that which I have borne from the outset -- namely, Special Assistant to the Director.
3. Date organized with copies of directives. I received this assignment in October or November of 1945. The assignment was personal and oral. No other directives have ever been given me.
4. Place of the historical unit in the administrative structure. My place in the structure presumably remains what it always has been. As a Special Assistant to the Director, I report directly to General Donovan, and I am responsible to, and report to, nobody else. No provision has ever been made for conferring any particular place in the structure on this historical function as such.
5. General functions of the historical unit. I conceive it to be my task to write the most complete possible account of the organization and functioning of the OSS. Ideally, I should like to write a history which would answer any question which any reasonable person might wish to ask about the OSS, whether from the viewpoint of administration and organization, or personnel, or finances, or doctrine, or operations both in this country and in theaters of operations and elsewhere abroad. This is, of course, a task of considerable magnitude, and I may not be able to perform it to my own complete satisfaction. It is, however, the goal which I have set myself. I have no intention of going into any other aspect of the history of the war except insofar as that may be necessary to make clear the specific functions and operations of the OSS.
6. Organization of the historical unit. The "historical unit" consists of myself and my secretary-assistant. In time, I shall doubtless require the help of at least one or two assistants, and General Donovan has promised that such help will be forthcoming. Up to the present, though, the nature of my work has been such that I have been able to function most effectively alone, except for the help, as I say, of my secretary-assistant.
7. Personnel of the historical unit. Wallace R. Newell, historical officer. Title: Special Assistant to the Director. Grade: P-7. Qualifications: successively Washington, Rome and Berlin correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, 1931-1941. Author: "People Under Hitler." Secretary-assistant: Bertha Shurtok. Grade: GAF-7. Title: Research Technician. Qualifications: B. A. degree, 1934, Brooklyn College; M. A. pending submission of thesis, Brooklyn College. Miss Shurtok collects two primary categories of material: first, biographical material on officers and employees of the agency to whom reference is made in the history; second, background and other corroborative material available in published form necessary for placing OSS operations in their perspective or adding to the sometimes only skeletal material available in official files. All other work by Mr. Newell.

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8. Program of the historical unit. My work thus far has consisted primarily of making a survey of the material available and required. Because of the novelty of much of the agency's work, and the necessity of relatively frequent adaptations of the organization to new responsibilities, it has seemed desirable not to "freeze" the story into even preliminary first drafts of histolinguage. By the same token, it would be premature now to draft even a tentative outline by volume or volumes for any purpose except my own guidance. I certainly have no plans for publication, and I know of none contemplated by anyone else. In the nature of things, it would seem to me to be extremely difficult to publish most of the history of this agency.
9. Progress to date. As noted under (8) above, my work thus far has consisted primarily of making a survey of material available and required. I have made a preliminary study of virtually all the records in the General's files and of certain parts of the records in the files of certain branches, divisions, and other units. I have discussed the project with certain of the most responsible officers of the agency. I have made a study, mostly in order to clarify the background of the agency, of its origins, and the central idea which has governed it from the outset, of the special missions undertaken by General Donovan for the President to England in the summer of 1940 and to the Mediterranean in the winter of 1940-1941. I have committed to relatively coherent form only two categories of material: first, an account of these missions; second, an account of parts of the work of the old Foreign Information Service Branch, which later became the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information. I have made four copies of these accounts, two of which I have sent to the General, and two I have kept for my own use. These drafts are so rough and of such a preliminary nature, that they are not suitable for any use except as bases for further research.
10. Methods of Procedure. Beginning with a survey of the material in the General's files, I have studied the available records, making copies or excerpts of such material as I am able to foresee I shall certainly need, and merely noting the nature and contents of such other material as I conceive I may possibly need later. Much, if not most, of this material is in the form of long-hand notes which I make myself. In some cases, I have had documents photostated for my use. My secretary-assistant makes her reports in typewritten form. My material is all kept under conditions of the utmost security, which guarantees that no one except myself and my secretary-assistant has access to it.
11. Problems encountered. The principal problem, as you yourself will readily understand, is two-fold: first, much of the agency's operations has never been incorporated in adequate written accounts; second, the relatively frequent changes in the organization and functioning of the agency make it difficult to reduce the account of the OSW work to anything like final form under anything like present circumstances. I do not mention the problem of security, because methods for dealing with it are adequate in the agency. It is, however, obviously of the very greatest importance.

- 4 -

12. Evidence of value of the historical program to operating officials and others. I have no evidence of this in form which makes it possible to pass on. I have told relatively few people in the OSS that I am doing this work -- and nobody outside, of course. Among the few who do know of it, however, the consensus seems to be one of enthusiastic approval. You yourself will understand as well as anyone the necessity, as well as the value, of a history of the OSS. I think it is one of the most interesting and important experiments in the conduct of warfare which has been made for some time by this country. The agency is unique and unprecedented. Whatever part or parts of it may survive after this war, it seems to me imperative that the fullest possible amount of the experiment should be available -- though, of course, only to the extremely small number of responsible persons who would be competent to see the history and judge the agency. For the rest, I believe that when the time comes that it is possible to draft preliminary versions of the organization and functioning of the agency, such versions will be extremely helpful within the agency itself. As you know, our security is so terrific that every person, with extremely few exceptions, knows only his own work. One of the results of this is that, lacking any knowledge of the broad, over-all functioning of the agency, some members of the OSS may lack the stimulus to morale which comes from a knowledge of a total job of importance which is being well done. I think it should be possible, without violating security, to show at least parts of a good history of the OSS to a certain number of responsible officers whose morale and functioning might thereby be improved even beyond the very high levels which now obtain.

13. Miscellaneous. I have only one suggestion to make under this heading: I shall wish, naturally, to correlate my work with your own and with that of certain other of what my secretary refers to as "bystander" officers. I shall certainly want your help on some of the early history of the OSS on which you are so well informed, and I am positive that in your present labors you can give me a great deal of extremely valuable advice.

All of this, as I say, is for your official -- and personal -- knowledge alone. Please do not let anyone find out about this except in so far as this may be necessary for your own work. I dislike to seem finicky, but you know how we feel about security. I was unspeakably shocked to learn that the Bureau of the Budget people had prepared an article for one of the learned journals of the historians in which the names of historical officers were given. This recalled me to my senses on the question of security, and I hope I never commit another indiscretion.

Hope to see you soon.

All the best.

Yours,

Wallace R. Deneal

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Dec 11-60. 7257
Director, OSS
SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan c.c. Dr. Wm. L. Langer DATE: Nov. 15, 1948

FROM: Wallace R. Dowel L R D

SUBJECT: History

The people in the Bureau of the Budget who are encouraging the writing of official histories of war agencies are now circulating among a fairly large number of people, both in the Government and out, a certain amount of the information about these histories which they have obtained from those engaged in writing them. This seems to me to raise a serious question of OSS security. I should think it would be highly inadvisable to have it generally known that a complete history of the Office is being written, since that necessarily indicates that the author of the history must be in possession of much, if not most, of the facts about the Office's operations.

I have, therefore, told the people in the Bureau of the Budget concerned that I have been transferred to other duties, after having succeeded only in making a study of the earliest period of the Office's history -- which I hope encourages the presumption that I am not particularly well informed about the Office's operations of the past eighteen months.

Next time I am in Washington I shall propose some method for dealing with future importunities on this subject by the Bureau.

CONFIDENTIAL

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

10 September 1947

FROM: Colonel Buxton
TO: Mr. Scribner
Mr. Shephardson
Dr. Langer
Lt. Dolan

1. Mr. Wallace R. Deuel, who has been appointed by General Donovan to write a history of OSS and its activities, is anxious to secure from individuals leaving the organization full detailed accounts of the work that they have done.
2. Since the course of military operations may cause a reduction in the scale of our activities in certain areas as, for example, in the case of Italy, will you please see that individuals in your branch who may be leaving the organization comply to the best of their ability with Mr. Deuel's request.

G. Edward Buxton
G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

CONFIDENTIAL

March 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

FROM: William J. Donovan

TO: Wallace K. Deuel

✓
Thanks for your note. I will
be glad to see you.

W.J.D.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

MEMORANDUM

March 16, 1949

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN
FROM: WALLACE R. DEUEL

SUBJECT: History

Sorry I had so little chance to bother you about the history this past week. I have reached a point now where I need a couple of hours of your time to clear up some points that can't be settled in any other way. I'll be down again all next week, I think, and hope I can bother you a lot more next time.

David Halberstam 7786
History of OSS
National

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

~~Confidential~~ - ~~Security~~

Colonel William F. Friedman
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel:

In order to facilitate the preparation of a historical study of the life of the President for the period 1939-1945, I am enclosing a list of statistical material which will be of use to you in your work to look up. I think so far as the statistical material is concerned, I am offering to have a certain amount of this work done for you by others, so I am taking you up on your offer. This is the material I need for this purpose:

1. The military situation in Europe for the period cent for you. In a general way, I know, of course, what this was, but I think the story would be better if it had greater description in so far as this is available. What are the best data now available on the following points: With how many divisions, of what sort, and from? Information is that the break-through occurred between Maubeuge and Montcornet, that the attack opened on May 10th and that the first German troops reached the Channel at Abbeville on May 20th. Any information becomes available recently to alter any of these earlier reports? How many men were there in the army formed by the German break-through, in the Dutch Army? In the Belgian Army? In the French Army? In the British Army? What types of troops were there? In what day did organized resistance in Holland end? On what day did Leopold ask for terms? How many men of which nationalities did the British evacuate from Dunkirk? On which date did this evacuation take place? On what date did the German offensive against the remaining British forces to the South open? On what date did Britain ask for terms? On what date was the Armistice signed? And, as a reflection of the military situation, on what date did Churchill become Prime Minister?

2. What was the situation in the United States:

What were the results, in per centage of votes cast, by geographical regions whenever possible, and with the dates, of all Gallup Polls published from September 1, 1939 to July 1, 1940 on questions dealing with the probable future course of the war and the part the United States should and probably would play in it?

I also need the texts of all the President's important public utterances on the course of the war, on the Nazis, Fascist, and Japanese, and on the attitude the United States should and would take toward the

I should also like to have mentioned in connection with the responsible approach of the administration, to the fact that the same approach is the same for all.

It would further be helpful to have the views of a representative group of other outstanding Americans in accordance with the Administration's Foreign Policy.

I also need the text of Federal Laws enacted directly or indirectly in the war, such as the "Neutrality Act," "War Relocation Act," "Lend-Lease Act," the "Food and Drug Act," the "War Relocation Act," and "War Relocation Act," and the "War Relocation Act," the agreement under which we have the right to use the "War Relocation Act," and the "War Relocation Act," for what other laws and regulations were enacted, and the groups were covered by this "War Relocation Act," and the "War Relocation Act," which was officially anticipated would be published.

It should also be able to bring the official documents together with other acts of National Policy connected with the war, such as the announcement out of our leading, in England and our, taking over of Germany.

but authorized and appropriated 1- for our armed forces of Japan, 1943-1945.

I also read a brief history of the American-English movement, approximately half a dozen reports of Rosenberg's utterances and activities, the text of Joe Kennedy's public remarks on the subject of the war, and a brief account of the short-lived movement headed by Percy Marshall.

3. In the articles on the DISTANCE Club published under your and Edgar Browning's signatures, I note that you advocated the suppression of German language publications in this country; legislation enabling the Executive to annul citizenship obtained under false pretenses; and a check of German connections of American industries and businesses. So far as you know, was this the first time any responsible person had advocated these measures? Is it possible to demonstrate that action taken to annul citizenship and check of German connections of American businesses was the result of your advocacy of these measures?

There is not awful lot of work involved in this, I know, but I have the feeling that this information is really needed in order to put in its proper perspective, first, your trip, and second, the establishment of the whole organization. Pope II's not too much trouble to assemble all this material.

All the Heat.

Yours,

Handwritten: 9-53, 10-11-53, 10-11-53, 10-11-53

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
680 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

Handwritten: 10-11-53, 10-11-53, 10-11-53, 10-11-53

MEMORANDUM

TO: COLONEL D. J. JONES

FROM: WALLACE R. BROWN

SUBJECT: P. I. S.

Attached is an "P. I. S." memorandum which I thought would interest you.

I thought it had already gone to you, which explains one of my comments at luncheon last Saturday. It takes nothing by this slight delay, though.

The fact that we have this memorandum is, of course, a dread secret.

COPY

MEMORANDUM

January 12, 1962

TO: Bureau Chief, Section 4-11, Intelligence Fund

FROM: Joseph Barnes and James Garvey

SUBJECT: Relationship between Broadcast Control, Language Sections, and Planning and Intelligence.

1. Due to the recent reorganization of Broadcast Control, some confusion seems to have arisen concerning the relationship between the Language Sections, the Broadcast Control Editors, and the Regional Intelligence men.

2. The relationship between these three groups may be simply stated as follows:

Broadcast Control serves both operations and planning. It is responsible to Mr. Barnes for the supervision of the output of the Language Sections from the point of view of good radio, good production, consistency and homogeneity of output. It is responsible to Mr. Garvey for the carrying out of plans, directives, and plans. It is responsible to Mr. Garvey for what is said and to Mr. Barnes for how it is said.

3. The Regional Intelligence men perform two functions:

(a) They are assistant planners, each for their special region.

(b) They provide for the Language Sections special material with which the Language Sections are enabled to carry out plans and directives.

4. There has been some misunderstanding as to whether the Intelligence men should or should not have direct contact with the Language Sections, or whether they should work solely through the regional editors of Broadcast Control. Obviously, the Intelligence men should work very closely with and be in constant contact with both the Language Sections and the regional Editors of Broadcast Control. It is their function to help work out weekly directives for their areas in cooperation with the Language Sections and the regional Editors of Broadcast Control, and it is likewise their function to provide to Broadcast Control and to the Language Sections whatever information they are able to obtain which will assist in the carrying out of these directives.

5. Just as the Language Sections and the Broadcast Control regional editors cooperate in the establishment of weekly regional directives and daily guidances, so should the Intelligence men cooperate in production and control. To this end, it is essential that they should listen to programs as often as possible, and make reports on their effectiveness.

6. If there remain any unanswered questions concerning the foregoing, inquiries are solicited.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 630 FIFTH AVENUE
 NEW YORK, N. Y.

Level 1000
10/1/48
SECRET

TO: COLONEL BROWNE
 FROM: WALLACE R. BROWN

SUBJECT:

- (1) Mr. Wilkie in Baghdad
 (2) New Organization in the O.S.S.

(1) Attached is a report on Mr. Wilkie's visit to Baghdad which I thought would interest you. It is particularly noteworthy that the Moslems gave a banquet to Mr. Wilkie during his visit. This behavior observe this "Lent" with fanatical piety, and it is a tremendous tribute to Mr. Wilkie and/or the United States that they broke their fast in such a spectacular manner. It is also most significant that drinks were served, because the "prohibition" among Moslems means a great deal more to them than our prohibition ever did to us.

(2) Further attached is a copy of an order explaining the latest reorganization of the Overseas Branch of the O.S.S. You will see from it that the Overseas Branch is now governed almost altogether by the Broadcast Control Unit under Ed Johnson, subject only to the superior authority of Joe Barnes (and, of course, Bob Sherwood) and to the advice and consent of Jack Houseman. The influence of the planners and of the intelligence officers is negligible. You will also notice that Ed Johnson is engaged in building up his own regional advisers, who enjoy authority superior to that of the other regional units of the organization.

I have come by these documents by methods which are quite improper and illegal and the most harmful consequences would result if it should be known that anybody in the O.S.S. even knew of their existence.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
650 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

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SECRET
610

MEMORANDUM

November 24, 1948

TO: COLONEL DORRAN
FROM: SALACE R. DUNSTON

SUBJECT: (1) Mr. Wilkie in Baghdad
(2) New Reorganization of the O.S.S.

(1) Attached is a report on Mr. Wilkie's visit in Baghdad which I thought would interest you. It is particularly noteworthy that the Moslems gave a banquet to Mr. Wilkie during Ramadan. True believers observe this "Lent" with fanatical piety, and it is a tremendous tribute to Mr. Wilkie and/or to the United States that they broke their fast in such a spectacular manner. It is also most significant that drinks were served, because the "prohibition" among Moslems means a great deal more to them than our prohibition ever did to us.

(2) Further attached is a copy of an order explaining the latest reorganization of the Overseas Branch of the OSS. You will see from it that the Overseas Branch is now governed almost altogether by the Broadcast Control Unit under Edd Johnson, subject only to the superior authority of Joe Barnes (and, of course, Sam Sherwood) and to the advice and consent of Jack Houseman. The influence of the planners and of the intelligence officers is negligible. You will also notice that Edd Johnson is engaged in building up his own regional advisors, who enjoy authority superior to that of the other regional units of the organization.

I have come by these documents by methods which are quite improper and illegal and the most harmful consequences would result if it should be known that anybody in the O.S.S. even knew of their existence.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

Account of Willkie's Visit to Baghdad, Iraq
Given to Willkie by an American Naval Lieutenant
Stationed in Iraq

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: September 14, 1942

Willkie was warmly received upon his arrival. His floor official gave him a place in the front of the line. There was a small official luncheon at which Willkie apparently said his every word -- if they were pro-German. There was an awkward pause until someone piped up and explained that they were not so much pro-German as anti-British. Since there was no Englishman present at the luncheon, no bones were broken. On the other hand, there is a very striking fact to be observed throughout this region. Everyone seems to be pro-American. It is said that American missionary colleges were responsible for the Arab renaissance, and they still seem to believe that we have no imperforable designs.

After luncheon Willkie went out to see the town and stopped in a coffee shop along the water front somewhere. He had ever done that in Ford in Baghdad, for these shops are not frequented by great emissaries from foreign states. As a result, when the news was spread abroad of what the great man had done, American stock jumped five points. Imagine Wendell Willkie, the great American demagogue, standing with the scotties having food. It was a very appropriate move. The British never did that. And Churchill, of course, whipped over Iraq with no stops. So did Cripps, and so too did everyone else whose journeys may or may not have been a military secret.

That same Saturday night there was a reception at the Public Relations' Chief's house (British) where five British Brigadiers (all with their red-tabs) were to be seen. The five were all of them very fine gentlemen, affable, talkative and not pukka at all. In fact they were so agreeable that it seemed fairly obvious that the British put here must have been given special orders to be cordial to their cousins and that they were trying like hell to do it.

But, for all their friendliness, the dinner on that occasion was no better than a snack when compared to the feast served on the following evening. It was Sunday the 13th of September. It was also a Jewish holiday and one of the first days of the Moslem Holy month of Ramadan, which is equivalent to Lent among the infidels. Hence no one eats during the day and no one drinks liquor at all. But the Iraqi showed their least love for this occasion without scruple. First there was a pre-dinner snack on a lot of green grass by the banks of the Tigris. Drinks were served off in a corner behind a straw mat screen. Then came dinner, with the Iraqi Prime Minister reading a speech in English, and Willkie answering with a fine one, and then there were more drinks.

After dinner the show continued with a band of champagne served from behind the scenes. Earl Fane persuaded a young American Naval Lieutenant with a glass. Everyone drank a great many drinks. It was lots of fun and very ostentatious, with the lights glowing silently through the gardens, an Iraqi band playing Indian overtures, diplomats in "sneakers", our U. S. Navy boys in their "dresses", drinks behind the screen, and the Prime Minister in his "cocktail".

Smoking is a smoking the world around -- not your favorite sight -- but "cigarette" is a term not to fear. It means a new jacket.

After toasting and drinking the guests moved over the lawn and sat beneath the palm trees, while naughty girls swayed like willows in a wind, and Wilkie warned a front-line seat. Inland dancing girls know a trick or two. They started off well-dressed. Five of them were out, sang naively, blacked their lips but pudge fingers and rocked back a bit. Then they threw in some jazz for the accidental occidentals, but soon went back into their routine. About 11:30 p. m. the dancing girls became fewer, their clothes scantier, and their years younger. Till at midnight there was one little number left, a girl, dressed in a chainmail of strategically placed bangles, who did bumps and grinds that made (your) Road look like a piker. The occidentals, of course, cheered and cheered.

The Military and Naval Forces sat behind Mr. Wilkie. A British Brigadier in his red tabs chuckled like a book turkey and asked the Yanks if they would like to dance with some lovely girls. They jumped at the chance. So he brought over fifteen English nursing sisters who have been healing the sick in Iraq since the last war -- many age of about forty-five. The Americans soon found themselves trapped with these phosphorescent Florence Nightingales and obliged to dance all the newest and rarest jazz dances.

One Naval Lieutenant was lucky enough to be able to sneak off with Joe Barnes and Major Daghastan, who was Wilkie's Iraqi ADC -- a young buck who spoke fluent English learned at the British Staff College in Delhi, and who was very good fun. Together these three tossed off a whiskey (Irish whiskey at that) behind the screen and, so fortified, could continue their session with the nurses. Finally Wilkie toddled off, the American boys chuckled the ladies in white, and "screamed" for bed, tired out.

After Wilkie's departure on Monday, our Naval "ferret" went off to dinner with Seton Lloyd, British archaeologist, and head of the Iraqi Museum, where everything about the Middle East is to be found. They had dinner in the former Italian legation, with a marble fountain, spouting lions, maidens. Here they reveled in a bath of martini served with fish roe from the Mediterranean, until the war looked pretty good. Talk was fine throughout the evening, which ended when everybody folded at midnight, for all people stay up until twelve when they go out for dinner in these parts. For Baghdad read Singapore before it fell -- and Cairo.

CONFIDENTIAL

November 14, 1943

TO: Messrs: Carl A. Frato Louis Brown Thomas E. Barrett
 Joseph Barnes Sam Beachell Kenneth Lewis
 Edward Barrett Gunnar Bergell Benjamin Miller
 Bjarne Granby Frank Hoeffling H. Miller
 Milton Brown John Houtman Herbert Lindholm

 Andre Vlasen Dr. Gustaf Van Doren
 Jas. P. Harburg Janet Murphy

FROM: Edd Johnson

A memorandum from Joseph Barnes issued on November 15th, defined the duties of regional editors in Broadcast Control as follows:

"The regional editors will consult with the language sections about the day-to-day implementation of policy, directives and guidance. They will participate in the drawing-up of regional directives and will serve the planning and intelligence panels, as advisors, in seeing that directives are faithfully carried out."

The following assignments of regional editors in Broadcast Control will be effective Thursday, November 19th. Each of these regional editors will have assistants functioning in his absence:

ENGLISH	REMINGTON PROX
FRENCH	LAWRENCE G. BLOOMMAN
GERMAN	WILLIAM TYLER
MISCELLANEOUS	MYA PUTMAN
ITALIAN	MAURICE BROOKER
IBERIAN	R. RUTLEDGE SOUTHWORTH
SCANDINAVIAN	RAY DESK EDITOR

The Central Control Desk will be manned -

8 a.m. - 5 p.m.	Douglas Schneider
4 p.m. - 1 a.m.	O. W. Riegel
1 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.	Arthur Eggleston

The assignments of the assistant regional editors and the assistant central desk editors will be posted on the Broadcast Control bulletin board.

The decentralization of Broadcast Control chores should enable the regional editors to give more time to the assignments outlined in Mr. Barnes' memorandum of November 15th.

November 10, 1948

TO: International Corps and Staff, Bureau

FROM: Joseph, Bureau

SUBJECT: Function of Broadcast Control Division

With the opening of an American Embassy in Berlin and the probability of sharply increased American broadcasting by the English services, certain changes in the operations of this office are inevitable. Toward this end, Mr. Johnson has been reorganizing the Broadcast Control Division into separate regional groups of editors, thus freeing himself more and more for overall editorial supervision of our program. The following statement is intended as a temporary guide to script writers in the language sections. Each of it will be subject to revision by experience.

Regional editors - The regional editors in Broadcast Control will cover:

- French
- German
- English
- German
- Miscellaneous
- Scandinavian
- Italian
- Day control desk
- Night control desk
- CBS editor
- ABC editor

Assignments are being made by Mr. Johnson.

The regional editors will consult with the language sections about the day-to-day implementation of policy, directives and guidance. They will participate in the drawing-up of regional directives and will serve the planning and intelligence panel, as advisors, in seeing that directives are faithfully carried out.

The plan here is to reduce the minor frictions which have resulted in the past from the negative functions Broadcast Control has been required to exercise. Security makes it necessary for some of these negative functions to continue. But from now on, editors and writers in the language sections should call on the Broadcast Control regional editors more frequently for interpretation of guidance and directives. A few moments of consultation before writing a script may result in the saving of much time and effort, and will considerably reduce the many minor disagreements which tend to arise when scripts are discussed only after they have been written.

None of this contemplates any major change in our operations. As before, Broadcast Control decisions will be final for any specific broadcast in question. This is to avoid unnecessary delay. As in the past, discussion of these decisions is encouraged. Appeals from Broadcast Control may be taken to Mr. Johnson, Mr. Houseman, or myself, in consultation with the respective intelligence officers.

Central Broadcast Control Desk - Regional Broadcast Center sections will have assistants, as far as possible, to function in their absence. At all times, day and night, a central control desk will have the latest and most authoritative guidance available on any problem of news treatment. Its guidance is received from any source, it will be communicated to this desk, and through it to the language sections. When news is breaking fast, it will be well to check with this desk before writing a script. It will be a duty of this desk to make sure that all guidance becomes effective as early as possible in the flow of material through this office by establishing the closest possible working relationship with the Basic News Desk.

Editorial and Control Policy - Both the editorial editors and the central control desk will function under Mr. Johnson as chief of the division. But a important reason for this decentralization of control is the necessity of releasing Mr. Johnson for the increasingly important job of editing and coordinating the output of this office as a whole. In doing this, he will work through the regional editors and the control desk but he will be concentrating on the following problems:

1. Working out a satisfactory transition from all-news programs to something better than our old news and feature formula. This will mean considerable experimentation with short news features, with commentaries and with special events programs.
2. Supplying the planning board with concrete requests for guidance, before the 5:30 daily meetings, based on the news itself.
3. Working out Broadcast Control operations for the program work of CBS and NBC which will preserve the individuality of their programs and yet guarantee security and coordinated propaganda policy.
4. Working out Broadcast Control over programs which may be presented by United Nations governments over our transmitters.
5. Preparing execution reports for the guidance of the planners and others in Washington.
6. Preparing to extend control to other kinds of output of the Overseas Operations Branch of the O.W.I.

In working on these problems, Mr. Johnson will welcome advice and suggestions, especially from the intelligence officers and the language sections.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 8TH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

October 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN
FROM: WALLACE R. DEVEL

SUBJECT: Theatre Political Officers

Here is a list of men who I think would be suitable political officers to be assigned to theatre commanders. In cases where the data on the men are incomplete, they can be supplemented if the information given seems to warrant this.

GERMANY:

1. Erwin May. For several years Treasury Attaché in Berlin. His duties took him all over the country and brought him into close contact with German businessmen, bankers, and industrialists. Speaks excellent German. Age between 35-40. Extremely likeable. Musky. Married but childless. Now doing some sort of special work for the Treasury or BEN.
2. Irving H. Sherman. For several years Berlin representative of A. G. Becker & Co., 34 Pine Street, New York City. Has always extremely well informed, particularly about economic and financial conditions. Age about 45. Recently married and with one or two stepchildren. Intelligent, amusing, and very forceful in a quiet way.
3. Ed Night. For several years Berlin representative of Brown, Harriman & Co. Age between 45-50. Married but separated from his wife. Now in Switzerland; purposes of being there unknown to me. Affable. Able. Particularly well informed about economic and financial conditions. Served in the last war and tried to get into both American and Canadian service in this war, but rejected because of age.
4. Arthur Peterson. For several years Berlin representative of the Guaranty Trust Co. Now in the bank's London office. Doing some work with the BEN there. Married and with two children from whom he has been separated except for brief leaves of absence for the last couple of years. Age 50-55. Unusually determined and clear thinking. Particularly well informed about economic and financial conditions in Germany.
5. Otto Tolischus. For several years correspondent in Berlin.

first for Hearst and later for the New York Times. Of Lithuanian parents. His mother and two brothers and their families were still living in Vienna the last I heard. Age 45-50. Correspondent for the last approximately two years in Tokyo. Recently returned on the Gripsholm. Now writing a book about his experiences in Japan. An unusually hard driver, both of himself and of others. Inclined to be dogmatic. Intelligent and unusually well informed about conditions in general in Germany. A collection of his New York Times articles on Germany was published some time ago in book form under the title "They Wanted War." Unmarried.

6. Fred Oeschner.

7. Douglas Miller.

8. Charles Farver. For several years Secretary of Embassy in Berlin. Now stationed in Reykjavik. Age about 40. Unmarried. Knows Germany well.

9. Edward E. Reattle, Jr. For several years United Press correspondent in Berlin. Knows Germany very well. Speaks the language well, and gets along well with Germans. Was chief of the United Press London Bureau. Author of a forthcoming book entitled, "Treaty to Pass." Age about 35. Unmarried.

10. Joseph Grigg. For several years United Press correspondent in Berlin. Now in the U. P. London Bureau. Age about 35. Unusually able. Well informed on Germany.

ITALY

1. Howatt Mitchell. For several years American Commercial Attache in Rome. Now living in semi-retirement somewhere on the West Coast. Married and with one or two children. Age between 45-50. An unusually able man, entirely familiar with Italy up to the time he left there in 1944.

2. Dr. Lewis Mackett. For several years a representative of the Rockefeller Health Agency in Italy, Albania, and the Adriatic in general as specialist in Malaria. Entirely familiar with that part of the world. Excellent company and extremely likeable. Age probably about 50. Married. Children, if any, must now be grown.

3. Father Burke. Rector of the American College in Rome for the training of theological students. Age now probably about 55. Entirely conversant with church affairs in Rome and with Italian ecclesiastical circles. A hale, hearty "Friar" type of Priest.

4. John T. Philander. For several years Rome correspondent, first for the New York Herald Tribune and then for the Chicago Daily News. He covered the European and Spanish Civil Wars. Saw action on both the Franco and the Republican sides in Spain. Considerable experience spent relatively short time as a correspondent in other parts of the world, including Russia and the Middle East. Age about 55. Separated from his wife. Has been promised a commission as intelligence officer with a vacant unit of the Marines if he can pass the physical examination. Has been prevented from trying this because of a condition of the back on which he has recently had an operation to correct. Ardently desires to be attached to a combat unit of the armed forces as long as he thinks there is a good chance of this, he will probably be disinclined to consider anything else.

5. William H. Stoenman. For a few years Rome correspondent of the Chicago Daily News. Served later for a few years in Moscow. Since 1936 London correspondent. One of the dozen ablest newspaper men in Europe today. Morningstar. Intelligent, gets along magnificently with other people. Age about 30. Married. One child. Separated from his family since outbreak of the war.

6. Herbert Matthews. For several years Rome correspondent of the New York Times. Was with the Italian army in Ethiopia. Now in India for the Times. Definitely prefers to continue with his career as a newspaper man but might possibly be persuaded to enter Government service. Family connections unknown. Age about 37. An unusually able man.

7. Joseph Phillips. For several years Rome correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune. Became Moscow correspondent seven or eight years ago and served there for approximately 4 years. Either separated or divorced from his wife. Childless. Now in the Army doing some kind of public relations work. Might very likely prefer serving with the U. S. S. R. Age between 35-40. Unusually able. For some time prior to entering the Army he was foreign editor of News Week.

CHINA:

1. A. T. Steele. For several years correspondent in China, first for the New York Times, and for the last several years for the Chicago Daily News. Age between 35-40. Married. One or two children. The best man in the Far East. Universally liked and respected by those who know him and his work.

2. Malcolm Jones. For many years correspondent in China for the New York Times. In this country for the last year or two. Age 35-40. Family connections unknown.

JAPAN

1. Hi. K. Elalshag. Son of the founder and for many years writer and publisher of the "Japan Advertiser" in Tokyo. Now in this country. Also served for several years as correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune.

SCANDINAVIA

1. Alfred Peterson. For several years correspondent in Scandinavia for the Associated Press. Now in the Publications Section of the O.R.I. Has also served in Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, and other posts. Age between 35-40. Unmarried. Of Swedish parentage.
2. Harry Gade. Son of a former Norwegian Minister to the United States. For many years in the American Diplomatic Service. Age between 35-40. Unmarried, the last I knew. Naturally familiar with Norway. Has served in several other posts.

GREECE

1. Herbert P. Lapadula, Jr. For many years in charge of YMCA work in Greece. On good terms with the Royal Family as well as with all other sorts and conditions of Greeks. Speaks, reads, and writes Greek. Married. Two sons of middle teen age. Now with YMCA in Rochester, New York. Age about 40. Lively, aggressive, zealous, and able.
2. George Keller. For several years Athens correspondent on the New York Times. For the last two or three years correspondent for the Chicago Daily News in Greece and more recently in the Far East. Reserved, scholarly, conscientious, and able. Age between 35-40. Unmarried.

RUSSIA

1. William Henry Chamberlain. For several years Moscow correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor. Age 40-45. Now in this country. A scholar. His books on Russia incurred considerable displeasure in the Kremlin.
2. Walter Duranty.

INDIA

1. Philip Talbot. For the last several years student and observer in India for Walter S. Rogers' Institute of Current World Affairs, (The Charles R. Cross Foundation). Age about 30. Unmarried. Graduated with high honors from the University of Illinois. He was Colonel of the student ROTC Brigade. Son of a distinguished professor

of engineering. Worked for a time following graduation for the Chicago Daily News, was "loaned" also to Walter Rogers. Is in India now, I believe.

GENERAL:

1. James E. Hession. For several years London correspondent of the New York Times. Returned to America in December, 1940. Has just returned from London where he spent two or three months helping set up the London office of the O. W. I. Married. Two children. Age about 47. One of the ablest younger men in the foreign end of the newspaper business in this country. Author of "Prelude to Victory."
2. Joseph C. Harrah. Has served abroad in various posts for the Christian Science Monitor. Author of "Pattern of Conquest," one of the first of the correspondents' books about Germany at war. An unusually able man. Married. One or two children.
3. Herbert May. For many years Vice Chairman of the International Opium Commission, with headquarters in Geneva. Age from 60-65. Married. Children grown. An unusually affable and able man. Well versed in international affairs in general as they unfolded in Geneva. Independently wealthy.

Doug 9116
Plan
Organization

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 21, 1962

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Donovan
From: Edmund L. Taylor
Subject: Comments on Attached Memorandum.

All the suggestions in this may seem sound to me, but I have the feeling that there is nothing new in this from the G-2 point of view and that probably the men in G-2 concerned with this sort of thing have gone into it even more deeply.

My suggestion would be that we show it and discuss it informally with someone who is familiar with these problems before doing anything more with it.

710

DATE Aug. 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY TAYLOR

Would you take a look at
this?

W. J. D.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

Wally
By - Devel

Design For Confirmation

It is assumed that action of the sort under consideration will really be taken. Obviously if the following suggestions are adopted and no such action follows, much more can be done.

It is suggested that the following measures be adopted in the chronological order in which they are listed.

Let x be the place where the action is to occur.

Let a , b , c and d be other places where such action might be reasonably expected to occur.

- 0 -

1. Encourage the enemy to believe that no such action is contemplated.

This device has the disadvantage that any evidence produced in its use may be used by the enemy, whether he believes it or not, to convince our friends and allies that the action will not occur, which will dishearten these people and possibly even their governments. This might be particularly undesirable if it occurred among the people of the area where the

- 2 -

action is to take place.

This would be more than compensated for, however, by the advantage to be gained if the enemy himself is deceived, or even if doubts are raised in his mind.

The following measures are suggested as calculated to serve this first purpose:

1. Plant on at least two but not more than five or six newspapermen and/or radio commentators, that the action will not take place.

Do this in such a way that the persons on whom the story is planted firmly believe it themselves and are free to use the story and to attribute it to "authoritative" or "well-informed" sources, but not, of course, to the actual sources.

The persons on whom the story is planted should be such that their use of the report will inspire credibility in the mind of the enemy.

First, the persons chosen should have the reputation of having access to a certain amount of official information. Second, they should have the reputation, either of being so hostile to the administration that they would betray an important state secret to score a point against their own government; or of being so ignorant of military and political matters that they do not realize the significance of what they are

doing; or of considering themselves as important as to be above the considerations of security involved; and/or of being such passionate believers in the necessity and desirability of the action under consideration that they feel it a "higher duty" to reveal the truth.

Thus it would be a mistake to plant this story on Raymond Green Swing, Major George Fielding Elliot, Hanson Baldwin, William L. Shirer, Paul Schuchert or anyone of their sort. On the other hand, the following persons might be used: Drew Pearson, Dorothy Thompson, Arthur Krock, John O'Donnell, Leonard Lyons, Cissie Patterson, Gabriel Haster, possibly Walter Winchell, and some correspondent of the Chicago Tribune.

As soon as the story has been used, evidence should be produced that its use has caused concern in responsible quarters, and ^{that} every reasonable discreet effort is being made to suppress it.

Officials who may be asked before use of the story whether or not it is true should deny it with vehemence and with the urgent request that it not be used because of the harmful effects its use would cause. This request, however, must be couched in such terms that the desire of the correspondent to use it, and his intention to do so, are strengthened, not weakened. Any official experienced in dealing with newspaper men will know how to do this.

- 4 -

Officials who may be asked after use of the story if it is true should issue routine, lead-gas denials as brief as possible, giving every sign of not wishing to discuss the matter at all.

Persons using the story should be remonstrated with or sternly rebuked and possibly even threatened with punishment, depending on who they are and other circumstances.

The highest appropriate military authorities should immediately ask the Office of Censorship to request all radio stations, newspapers and other publications not to use the story.

The office of naval censorship should instruct all its censors to prevent the story from leaving this country by channels subject to their supervision.

The appropriate military authorities should also ask the Office of War Information to refrain from using the story in its short-wave radio and other activities, and to request private short wave stations also to refrain from using it.

B. Allow the enemy to obtain some "secret message whose implication is that the action under consideration is not to be taken.

- 3 -

This message should not be a flat assertion to this effect, but should pertain to some technical detail.

Suppose, for example, that large quantities of Weapon Q would inevitably be required for the action under consideration. Then allow the enemy to obtain a message indicating that the supply of Weapon Q on hand is utterly inadequate at the bases which would be used for the action under consideration and that there is no likelihood that adequate stores can be built up before mid-winter. This is a civilian's crude example; a better one can and should be used.

The message should be in a code the enemy is known to be able to break, but if possible one that the enemy is not aware we know he can break.

The leak should occur in such a way that the enemy thinks we do not know it has occurred.

C. Three or four responsible spokesmen of the government—but not the President, the Vice President or the Secretaries of State, War or Navy—should deliver speeches or issue statements or make remarks to the effect that the military value of other sorts of operations already under way is equivalent to the value of the action under consideration, and that these other operations already constitute, in effect, such action. In some of these speeches, however, should the assertion be explicitly made, or even too openly implied, that the proposed action will not take

place.

Notwithstanding the proposed further measures which follow are not at all, and is not excluded by, the taking of the measures suggested under Point 1. above. It is believed that the attempt to convince the enemy that the proposed action will not occur at all will succeed among at least a few responsible enemy persons for at least a time. Such persons will tend to believe that the measures suggested under Points 2 and 3, below, represent only a bluff. Even if the number of persons who believe this is small, and even if they believe it for only a relatively short time, something will be gained. Disagreement will be caused among the enemy as to whether the action will occur, and time will be won.

2. Encourage the enemy to believe that the action under consideration is to occur at some place other than x.

If the enemy's knowledge of the forces at our disposal, and his opinion of our judgment, do not preclude the possibility, encourage him to believe that the proposed action will take place in the hemisphere other than that for which it is actually planned. If this deception cannot be made plausible, encourage the enemy to believe that the action will take place in the same hemisphere where it is actually planned,

- 7 -

but in some area other than x.

The following measures are suggested
as calculated to serve this second purpose:

A. Allow the enemy to learn
of apparently adequate preparations at bases which would indicate
that the action is to take place at x and at other bases which
would indicate that the action is to take place at a and b.

It will be difficult to
conceal the real preparations ~~xxx~~ in any event. The false
"preparations" will serve to confuse the enemy as to where the
action is really to take place.

Just enough evidence of
preparations should be allowed to show at the bases for x, a
and b for enemy reconnaissance aircraft to be able to see and
identify it.

The evidence at the base
for operations in x should be somewhat more apparent than that
at the bases for a and b—just evident enough to make it appear
that we are trying to call the enemy's attention to these
preparations and that we are really trying to conceal the
preparations at the bases for a and b

- 4 -

B. Allow the enemy to obtain "secret" "information" indicating that we intend to act in B.

This evidence should not be too obvious.

Suppose, for example, that a certain disease is endemic in B that does not exist in any of the other possible theaters of operations. Then allow the enemy to obtain a message indicating that great stores have been accumulated of a medicine that is used only in the treatment of this disease—or of this disease and a very few others not found in the other theaters of operations.

Or suppose that Sanskrit is spoken in B and in none of the other areas in question. Then begin classes in Sanskrit for the troops—and in no other language—and let this fact leak out.

Or suppose that the weather in B is hot, dry and sunny at a time that can reasonably be supposed the most likely for the action under consideration, whereas the weather in all the other possible theaters is cool and/or rainy and/or cloudy. Then allow the enemy to learn that you are accumulating shirts and sun helmets.

In all cases in which this point (2. B) is sought to be made, allow the enemy to know that

- 2 -

you are aware of the "leak," and simulate appropriate action.

For example, stage a court martial of the personnel "responsible" for the "leak", and do so in such a way that the enemy learns about it "in spite of" your "precautions."

C. Simulate a, b and d air and such other reconnaissance as may be feasible, on a scale adequate for the action under consideration.

D. Take into some military advisory position, or promote, or transfer to a base for operations in x, an advocate of, or expert in, operations in that theater.

If x is Sicily, for example, take one or more of the above measures in respect of Kernan.

If x is Norway, act in respect of Balchen.

If x is neutral, send or "plan" to send or pretend to send an important commission of military experts there such as would be sent to prepare the ground for the action under consideration. A notable influx of the suspicious type of "tourist," or demands for a suspiciously large number of passport visas for that country, would tend to serve the same purpose.

1.0 -

Allow this action to become known publicly and in a positive way and take no action afterward to in late displeasure that it has become known.

3. Encourage the enemy to believe that the action is to occur at some time other than that actually intended.

The following measures are suggested as calculated to serve this latter purpose:

A. Several weeks before the action is really to take place, make raids at a, c and x.

These operations should be strong enough to create the impression for at least 24 hours that they constitute the beginning of the major operation in view.

4 The three points should be of approximately equal strength.

A noisy but in other respects lesser raid should be made at b at the same time.

Just before these raids, suddenly cancel all leaves of all men who would be employed in the real, final operation, and round up all such personnel as may be already on leave at the time and send them to the bases.

B. Following these raids, there should be no further operations of this sort until the final action is to

and in.

3. This deception will normally be created when the final operation really begins.

4. Encourage the enemy to believe that the form which the action is to take will be different from that which is actually planned.

For example, if it is intended to employ large numbers of paratroops at some distance behind the enemy outposts in the opening phase of the operations, cause a "leak" which will indicate that you have no such intention.

There are many possibilities of this sort which will occur to those familiar with actual plans.

If this sort of deception is attempted, it may be applied to one or all or only some of the bases where preparations will be made and/or simulated for the action under consideration.

- o -

www/viii.17.42

Dual 7576

August 7, 1942

Mr. Wallace Duval
Office of Strategic Services
630 Fifth Avenue
New York City

Dear Wallie:

Thank you for your letter.

I hope to see you soon.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
EXHIBITION AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY

Deval 7076
O.S.S.
Cancelled

Room 3609
650 Fifth Avenue
August 3, 1949

Colonel William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel:

I am just moving in today and enjoying it thoroughly. Neither one of us seems to have an office quite yet, but we are scheduled to acquire one this week. Meanwhile, I am Mr. W. W. Ajax, in Room 3609, with one of the most magnificent views in the world. I can even see the 21 Club from here.

Thanks for yours of July 22nd confirming my status and functions. I imagine that I shall have completed the moving-in process this week. If you are not up here by the time I have finished, I'll be getting in touch to see if you would like me to come down there.

Yours,

Walter Sued

COI
Form 60COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
Official DispatchDate
FROM

To

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION

COL WILLIAM J. KENNEDY,
1647 30th ST NW

Acknowledged

Priority

Reaction

Deferred

Incoming Heading

WR100 21 XC

WEST OBT COMM JUL 31 1944 1127A.

RECEIVED

CHECKS JUST ARRIVED THANKS A LOT FOR REDEMPTING THE
 REPUBLIC AND MY CREDIT. REPORT MONDAY AT NEW OFFICE.
 HOPE SEE YOU SOON REGARD..

WILLIE DEUEL.

1242P..

Operator's Record

Paraphrased By

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
Official Dispatch

JULY 30 1942
Date
FROM

To	COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION	Acknowledge
DISTRIBUTION	COL. WM. J. DUNOVAN	Priorities
1647 30	17 NORTHWEST WASHINGTON	Routing
		Deferred

WUL45 59 DL AC Incoming Heading

WEAPON COMB TO LIMA.

RECEIVED

SORRY TO BOTHER YOU ABOUT THIS BUT HAVE TRIED BY ANYTHING ELSE
I CAN THINK OF FOR A MONTH WITHOUT A VAIL AND THE MATTER IS
BEGINNING ASSUME A CERTAIN PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE I HAVE
RECEIVED NO SALARY SINCE I ANNOUNCED I WAS JOINING YOU COULD
YOU USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO HAVE SALARY PAID BEGINNING WITH
CHECK DUE JULY 15TH THANKS REGARDS.

WALLIE DUEL.

1221P..

Operator's Record

Paraphrased By

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 22, 1962

Mr. Wallace Leuel,
431 South Compo Road,
Westport, Conn.

Dear ally:

In reply to your letter of July 14: You are right. You are to be directly responsible to me. You are not a member of any of the various divisions. You are not charged with any administrative duties. I do, however, want you to help me with ideas on psychological warfare and to inquire into various matters, particularly Germany, as occasion may require.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

1. The first part of the report is a summary of the information received from the source. It is a very brief summary, but it contains all the essential information. The second part of the report is a more detailed account of the events that took place. It is written in a very clear and concise manner, and it is easy to read. The third part of the report is a conclusion, which summarizes the main points of the report and gives some suggestions for further action.

2. The second part of the report is a more detailed account of the events that took place. It is written in a very clear and concise manner, and it is easy to read. The third part of the report is a conclusion, which summarizes the main points of the report and gives some suggestions for further action.

3. The third part of the report is a conclusion, which summarizes the main points of the report and gives some suggestions for further action.

4. The fourth part of the report is a conclusion, which summarizes the main points of the report and gives some suggestions for further action.

5. The fifth part of the report is a conclusion, which summarizes the main points of the report and gives some suggestions for further action.

*Send letter to
1931*

December 28, 1941


Stanford Federal Savings and
Loan Association
46 Atlantic Street
Stanford, Connecticut

Dear Sirs:

Replying to your letter of December 22nd, I have known
Mr. William B. Leuel for many years, and he has been employed
in this institution for more than a year. I am glad to say
that I have a very high opinion of Mr. Leuel and consider that
he would be a competent borrower of a mortgage loan on which
monthly payments are \$55.00. His income from his position
here is more than adequate, and he also has outside income
from book royalties. His general reputation is of the highest.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director



STAMFORD FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION
STAMFORD, CONN.

Secretary to C. L. Loney Co.,
2140 M Street, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Mr. Loney Co. is a member of our association. He has asked me to refer to you his application for a mortgage loan on his home. Would you be good enough to advise me whether in your opinion Mr. Loney would be a satisfactory borrower for a mortgage loan on which he would have to make the monthly payments of \$50.00.

We would value especially the opinion of his employer. To wish to give him credit if he is entitled to it, and your opinion will be valued by us and held in strict confidence.

Very truly yours,
STAMFORD FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION

By: *C. E. Talbot*
Secretary.

CUT:MS

WUF13 36 NT COLLECT

TDS HOLLYWOOD CALIF MAR 1

COL WILLIAM J DONOVAN COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

PUBLIC HEALTH BLDG

COMPLETING THIS WEEK AS MUCH OF ASSIGNMENT AS FUNDS NOW
AVAILABLE OR IN SIGHT MAKE POSSIBLE. IN AGREEMENT WITH
WALT, PLANNING LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON THIS WEEKEND UNLESS
COUNTERMANDED BY YOURSELF EOB OR TREASURY BEST REGARDS

WALLIE.

856A

April 1939
Jim

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

From SAC, [illegible]

1. Bob Murphy and the State Department have asked me to go to ETO--eventually to Germany--to act as Press Officer for Bob in his capacity as political adviser on German matters to General Eisenhower. Bob himself is leaving immediately for London, if he has not left already, and he and the Department would like me to follow as soon as possible. They say the assignment would probably last approximately a year.
 2. I should like very much indeed to do this. O. K?
 3. Bob and the Department don't care whether I remain on your payroll or transfer to that of the Department. I should prefer to remain on yours--assuming, as I do, that you can make financial arrangements to cover the situation at least as well as the Department can. O. K?
 4. If you approve of my taking on this assignment with Bob, there will be a few further, more detailed questions I shall need to take up with you at your earliest convenience. All of these questions can be settled in not more than four and a half minutes. When and where may I have that much of your time--and, of course, any more that may be available?
- (Mary and I will be in New York and/or Connecticut from this (Saturday) evening until Wednesday evening, and I shall try to reach you by phone in the City during that time. We plan to return to Washington Wednesday night or Thursday morning for a stay of several days).

5. Theol

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